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Overview 
 
 
The outlook for the Scottish economy 
appeared fairly certain when the 
Commentary last reported in July 2007. 
Growth was expected to remain above trend 
in 2007 and 2008 at 2.5% and 2.3% 
respectively. Prospects for the economy in 
the medium-term were considered to be 
good. Almost one year later, the comparative 
certainty of last July has evaporated. 
 
Since July, winds of change have swept 
through the world economy, which, along 
with more specific local developments, have 
had significant consequences for Scotland 
and its economy. In this Outlook & Appraisal 
we take a look at some of the issues that 
have confronted the Scottish economy over 
the last year and which are likely to have a 
significant bearing on future performance: 
the credit crunch; rising oil prices and 
commodity/food prices; Scotland’s business 
birth rate; rising public spending and 
crowding out; the Scottish government’s 
economic strategy 
 
We then turn to a consideration of recent 
trends in GDP and Output, concluding with a 
detailed consideration of the outlook for the 
Scottish economy and summarises our 
forecasts. Growth in Scotland falls to trend 
this year of 1.9% and then slows further to 
1.7% in 2009, picking up slightly to 1.8% in 
2010 and returning to the 1.9% trend in 
2011. Throughout this period net jobs 
continue to be created in the Scottish 
economy, although at fairly low rates, largely 
driven by the service sector. Unemployment 
is maintained at and below present levels. 
Scottish growth outperforms expected UK 
growth of 1.8% and stays just above UK 
growth of 1.6% in 2009. But in 2010 Scottish 
growth slips behind the UK again as the UK 
rate rises towards its trend at 2.5%. With UK 
growth now predicted to be around 2.6% in 
2011, we think it unlikely on present 
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information that the Scottish government’s 
target of parity with UK growth by 2011 will 
be met.  
 
The levels of uncertainty as to future 
outcomes are very high indeed given present 
conditions in the world economy. There is a 
considerable downside risk that growth and 
inflation in both Scotland and the UK will be 
worse than forecast here. 
 
 
Issues facing the Scottish economy during 
the past year 
 
Credit crunch 
 
The United States is teetering on the brink of recession with 
unemployment already rising and jobs growth minimal. This, 
in an economy that has proved to be a veritable job 
generation machine averaging 187,000 net jobs per month 
in the Clinton years and 102,000 monthly in the Bush years. 
 
It is now well understood that the trigger events in the US 
slowdown stemmed principally from the housing market: 
ending of the house price boom; house price falls and 
higher interest rates; massive foreclosures in the sub-prime 
mortgage market; significant bank and hedge fund losses as 
the value of innovative investments based on sub-prime 
mortgages collapsed; and the subsequent drying up of 
liquidity in financial markets, or ‘credit crunch’ as it is now 
popularly known.  
 
While in the short-term rising export demand, due to the 
much weakened dollar, appears to have offset the decline in 
residential investment in the US to the third quarter of 2007, 
the risk of a US recession remains as indicated by the 
recent job numbers. The credit crunch is spreading outside 
the financial sector because the willingness to lend to 
finance investment appears to be much reduced. And, the 
risks for the UK economy are much the same. The loss of 
trust occasioned by the sub-prime crisis has thrown a huge 
spoke in the wheel of the global financial system. Moreover, 
the credit crunch is exceptionally serious because, as the 
well-known economist Paul Krugman notes, the problem 
with the markets isn’t just a lack of liquidity, as in many 
previous financial crises, there’s also a fundamental 
problem of solvency that is still not fully identified. 
 
The openness of the Scottish economy to trade and 
investment ensures that the winds of economic change 
blowing from the US are reaching our shores. Scottish 
banks have not been unaffected by the crisis as the write-
offs and ‘rights’ issues pursued by the Royal Bank and 
HBOS indicate. Domestic consumption may also hold up 
better in Scotland because Scottish households tend to be 
less reliant on debt. House prices are holding up better here 
protecting domestic asset values and the jobs market is still 
relatively buoyant. But this does not mean that the 
performance of the financial sector in Scotland will escape 
the effects of the sub-prime crisis, or that overall economic 
growth will be unaffected. 
 
Scotland cannot be insulated from wider forces. What is still 
uncertain is the extent of the sub-prime losses in the global 
banking system and because of that the degree to which the 
financial system is pulling back from traditional lending 
activities. If that pull back is marked then there is little doubt 
that growth will slow considerably. 
 
 
Rising oil prices and commodity/food prices 
 
Since we last reported, households and firms are facing 
significantly higher energy, transport, and commodity, 
including food, costs. In July last year the price of West 
Texas Intermediate Crude was just below $75, almost a 
year later the price had reached $139. The latest BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 reveals that the oil 
price has been on an upward path for the last six years, the 
longest period of rising prices since records began in 1861. 
But the acceleration has come over the last 18 months.  
 
Rising oil and commodity prices produce both a price and 
income effect: they are a potential source of higher inflation 
and because demand is fairly unresponsive to prices rises 
they lower real incomes, reducing the demand for other 
goods and services and so lead to income and output 
reductions generally. The National Institute for Economic 
and Social Research (NIESR) in their latest Economic 
Review estimate that a permanent $10 dollar rise in oil 
prices will lower UK output by an average of 0.12% per 
annum between 2008 and 2011 and by 0.34% between 
2012 and 2018. Hence it would appear  - on our, not NIESR, 
calculations - that a permanent rise in the price of $100 
would lower output by about 1% per annum over the next 
three years and by around 3% per annum in the later period. 
Clearly, if correct, that would lead to zero or negative 
growth, in the absence of countervailing behaviour such as 
significant energy substitution. 
 
What is clear from such a simulation is that the level and 
duration of the oil price matters to our economic well being 
and so from a forecasting standpoint it is important to have 
some understanding of the likely course of oil prices. And in 
answering that question we need to establish the extent to 
which the higher price will be a permanent feature and at 
what level it will stabilise. 
 
The mainstream view is probably that the rising oil price 
principally represents fundamentals. That it is it is a 
reflection of demand outstripping supply. The rapid recent 
growth of the Indian and Chinese economies is considered 
to have pushed demand above supply. The BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy points out that global energy 
demand growth in 2007 was above the average for the fifth 
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year in succession.  For various reasons energy supply has 
struggled to respond despite the significant reserves of oil, 
gas and coal.  
 
On this argument energy prices and oil prices in particular 
will remain high and rising until consumers and producers 
respond to the price signals, with substitution and 
investment in favour of more energy efficient production 
processes, new production, new technologies and new 
energy sources such as wind, wave, solar and nuclear. 
Given the time that such responses are likely to take very 
high energy prices would appear to be with us for a long 
time. 
 
One issue that appears to be neglected by those punting the 
view that the oil price very largely reflects fundamentals is 
that demand is being artificially supported by fuel subsidies, 
primarily in Asia, which keeps the price at the pumps 
artificially low. These subsidies are beginning to be called 
into question by several of the governments offering them 
because of their rising cost. Both Malaysia and India have 
begun to reduce subsidies, but it appears less likely that 
China will follow suit given its commitment to economic 
growth. Nevertheless, some demand destruction will ensue 
as the subsidies start to unwind. Further demand 
destruction will occur as growth in the world economy slows 
due to the rise in oil prices and the credit crunch. 
 
But there are strong arguments that the rise in oil prices, 
especially over the last year, does have a significant 
speculative element, which in part cannot be divorced from 
the effects of the fallout from the problems of sub-prime and 
the credit crunch.  
 
Many investors in the commodity markets trade indexes, 
which are a composite of various commodities in different 
percentages. The amount of funds invested in these 
products, including oil futures, has grown exponentially in 
recent times. This means that there is much more 
speculator money in the market. It is very important at the 
current time to understand the interaction between the oil 
and financial markets. When times are hard many people 
turn to real physical assets as a means of investment. The 
effect of the sub-prime crisis and the credit crunch is that 
investors have lost faith in complicated financial products 
and started to invest/diversify into commodities in general 
including oil futures. But for various reasons this process 
should unwind and the oil price will peak as speculators 
cover their positions. A peak to the oil price may also be 
reached as the balance of supply and demand adjusts. 
 
The key issues then are: at what level is the price of oil likely 
to peak? When? And to what level will the price adjust? 
Goldman Sachs contends that oil prices may go to $200 a 
barrel by the end of 2008. Recent suggestions from the 
head of Gazprom that the price will go to $250 seem out of 
line with market expectations. Our judgement is that a peak 
will be reached in the next twelve months with the price 
moving down towards a more sustainable level with $80 or 
$90 per barrel most frequently mentioned. But we have no 
basis for judging the timescale over which such a movement 
would occur. 
 
Scotland’s business birth rate 
 
December 2007 saw publication of the latest Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Scotland report from 
Strathclyde University’s Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship. 
The report provided disturbing reading. 
 
On the GEM index of total early stage entrepreneurial 
activity (TEA) Scotland in 2006 ranked 6th bottom, or 37th 
top, from 42 sovereign nations plus Scotland.  This 
compared unfavourably with the position in 2005 where 
Scotland ranked 14th bottom, 22nd top, from only 35 
sovereign nations plus Scotland. 
 
However, the report argued that the slippage in Scotland’s 
relative position in 2006 was something of an illusion, 
because many nations have TEA rates around 5%. 
Moreover, while a rate of 4.2% in 2006 compared to 5.8% in 
2005 resulted in an appreciable fall in Scotland’s 
international ranking there was no statistically significant 
change in Scotland’s rate relative to those other countries. 
Scotland’s TEA rate in 2006 was not statistically different 
from its rate in 2005 but the rate is now significantly lower 
than the UK estimate of TEA for the first time in four years. 
 
The GEM Scotland team were nonetheless sufficiently 
troubled by these findings to look at other proxy measures 
of new firm formation for the period. The data on business 
bank account openings published by the Committee of 
Scottish Clearing Banks showed no evidence of a decline in 
new enterprise activity in 2006. Moreover, the data on VAT 
registrations – a well-used proxy for new firm creation – 
shows an increase in starts between 2005 and 2006, with 
the rise greater in Scotland than in the UK. 
 
So what are we to believe? If we prefer the CSCB and VAT 
data then this would not appear to augur well for the TEA 
statistic. If we accept the TEA data then we need to account 
for the deterioration. Moreover, all data sets imply that the 
business birth rate in Scotland remains low, which requires 
explanation in itself. 
 
The current GEM Scotland report focuses in on their 
evidence that fear of failure is a major barrier to start up 
amongst Scots. The report effectively debunks the myths 
that most new starts are doomed to fail and that business 
closure and business failure are the same. Using VAT data 
the report demonstrates that only about 10% of businesses 
have deregistered after one year, with 10% per year going 
thereafter. Yet, this still means that more than half are gone 
after five years. Is not a fifty/fifty survival rate at five years a 
sufficiently daunting prospect to deter many would be 
Scottish entrepreneurs?  
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GEM Scotland’s answer to this question is that 
deregistration and closure are not synonymous with 
business failure. The report points to evidence that the 
‘failure’ component in closure rates is actually quite small. 
For example it provides data from a tracking study of new 
Scottish companies that business mortality was around 
1.5% in the first year and averaged 11% to 12% after three 
years, significantly less than the deregistration rate for that 
period. 
 
Yet, it seems unlikely that such fears explain the apparent 
deterioration in the Scottish firm formation rate as measured 
by TEA. Nor would fear of failure appear to be sufficient in 
itself to account for Scotland’s historically low business birth 
rate. The myths about failure are clearly general and not 
simply confined to Scotland. 
 
However, the report does suggest an indirect route through 
which fear of failure might inhibit new starts. Bankers may 
take the view that new firm lending is more high risk than it 
actually is if they believe that failure rates are much greater 
than in practice. In such circumstances the cost of start up 
funds may be greater than it could be or less funding may 
be made available. 
 
The Scottish banking sector has made a strong case that 
funds are available to new start entrepreneurs that have 
appropriate business ideas and start-up skills such as ability 
to write business plans. They would contend that a low 
Scottish business birth rate is not a problem of the supply of 
finance but rather a problem of lack of suitable opportunities 
and hence demand.  
 
Yet, academic research suggests that bank lending to new 
starts in the UK might be greater in areas and regions with 
higher rates of home ownership. If correct this implies that 
banks prefer to lend to founders using houses as prime 
collateral, which would be a classic market imperfection that 
should be addressed by policy or the banks themselves. 
Much finance for new starts comes from friends and family 
and not the formal financial sector. But with Scotland’s 
home ownership rate still much below the rate in England 
and the south, institutional limits on the supply of 
appropriate finance to new starts may still be one factor in 
Scotland’s low business birth rate. 
 
 
Rising public spending and crowding out 
 
During the year the Scottish Parliament approved the 
Government Budget. While, quite properly, there was much 
discussion about the size of the increase and specific 
spending proposals there was little or no consideration in 
the Parliament or in the media of the question whether the 
scale of public spending in Scotland is damaging our 
economic growth.  
 
It is clear that there are many people in Scotland who view 
the level of public spending in Scotland with some concern. 
Many argue that with public spending amounting to 52% of 
GDP compared to around 41% in the UK, funds and 
resources are being diverted from more productive private 
sector use to the detriment of economic growth. We have 
discussed this issue in the Commentary before but it is 
worth reprising the arguments. 
 
How valid is this argument about the crowding-out effect on 
the private sector of high public spending in Scotland? 
 
We can’t say with certainty that the argument is invalid, but 
we can say that it is dubious. It is dubious because public 
spending in Scotland is higher than in UK because the UK 
taxpayer funds it. It is therefore wrong to claim that over half 
the economy is absorbed by public spending. What is more 
relevant is the tax burden of 37% (2005 data). Hence, the 
fiscal crowding-out effect on the private sector of this 37% 
tax burden will be no different from the UK since the tax 
structure and the tax burden are the same in Scotland and 
the UK.  
 
But is this tax burden likely to produce crowding-out effects 
in both Scotland and the rest of the UK? 
 
There is little doubt that, other things remaining equal, very 
high tax rates serve as a disincentive to effort and 
enterprise. But there is a question as to how ‘high’ is ‘high’!  
Moreover, other things are not equal. If high taxes are 
associated with high amenity provision through public 
spending e.g. good public transport facilities, an efficient 
health and education service etc., then incentives may not 
be damaged. Individuals may be content to take a return 
that comprises a social as well as a private wage. This 
appears to be the case in Norway (taxes 44% of GDP rank 
6th on tax, and 7th on growth) and Luxembourg (39% of 
GDP rank 11th on tax, and 4th on growth). And the tax 
burden there is certainly higher than in Scotland and the UK, 
which at 37% rank mid-table (15th) from 30 OECD countries 
in 2005 by tax burden (tax revenues to GDP) and 12th and 
11th respectively, by growth. Conversely, Switzerland (30% 
tax burden ranking 25th from 30) and Japan (27% tax 
burden ranking 26th from 30) have low taxes but also fairly 
low growth. (GDP per head growth from 1990 to 2004 
ranking 29
th
 Japan and 30
th
 Switzerland from 30 OECD 
countries.) 
 
Recent survey evidence from researchers in Austria 
(Handler et al) on the optimal size of the public sector, 
suggests that overall crowding out effects only occur when 
own-financed public spending amounts to around 40% of 
GDP - a figure above, although close to, the tax burden in 
Scotland and the public spending ratio in the UK.  
 
Yet, since Scotland runs a large fiscal deficit compared to 
the UK can this cause crowding out and lower growth? The 
answer must be no, because Scotland shares the UK 
interest rate, which is influenced by net borrowing at the UK 
not the Scottish level. 
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Finally, on public spending, if it is higher per head in 
Scotland than in the UK won’t that lead to prices and wages 
being bid up here to the detriment of the competitiveness of 
the economy? The answer to this is, yes, at least initially, 
but not necessarily to the overall detriment of growth. Model 
simulations at the Fraser of Allander Institute discussed in a 
previous Commentary suggest that the positive effect of 
higher public spending on demand and output outweighs the 
negative effect of higher wages and input prices on private 
sector output. Moreover, since markets tend to adjust more 
effectively between regions and countries that are part of a 
stable monetary union, resources flow readily in response to 
price and quantity signals. Hence, any pressure on price 
and supply due to the increased public spending is 
eventually eased.  
 
So, evidence at the national and international level that high 
levels of public spending may be associated with slower 
growth, is probably not as relevant at the sub-state level 
because of the ease with which supply can adjust through in 
and out-migration of resources. 
 
Are there routes other than taxation, spending and interest 
rates, through which the size of the public sector may 
crowd-out private sector activity and reduce growth even at 
the sub-state or regional level? 
 
The answer to this question is also, yes. 
 
One key route is the effect of the role of the public sector as 
a producer. The public sector currently (3rd Quarter, 2007) 
accounts for 23% of employment in Scotland compared to 
20% in UK; this is much less than the 52% share of public 
spending in GDP. So, the public sector as a producer is 
larger here than in the UK but not dramatically so. 
 
Why should a large public sector producer serve to crowd-
out private sector activity and reduce growth? 
 
The main possibility for a negative effect would appear to be 
if workers diverted into the public sector become less 
entrepreneurial. There is international evidence from the 
south of Italy (Alesina) that the scale of public employment 
has damaged entrepreneurial activity. But our work in the 
Centre for Public Policy for Regions on new firm formation in 
Britain suggests a positive relation between public sector 
share and the business birth rate. Moreover, Henley and 
Thomas (2001 – Regional Studies) found a weakly positive 
relationship between public sector employment growth and 
private sector employment growth across the British 
regions. The relationship was more strongly positive in 
Scotland and the North of England. The jury is, therefore, 
still out on this issue. 
 
Other international research by Afonso and others finds that 
the performance and the efficiency of the public sector itself 
are negatively related to its scale. This might imply that the 
previous Scottish Executive and the current SNP 
Government’s drive to improve performance and efficiency, 
while welcome, may ultimately run up against the 
diseconomies of scale that may be the inevitable outcome of 
a large public sector. 
 
And one final point. The latest international econometric 
research on government expenditures and economic 
growth
i
 published at the end of 2007 in the journal Fiscal 
Studies, by Pak Hung Mo of Hong Kong Baptist University, 
offers an interesting finding. His work suggests that 
government consumption expenditures have a negative 
impact on economic growth while government investment 
outlays have a positive impact. Hence, a reallocation of 1 
percentage point of government consumption to government 
investment raises the GDP growth rate by 0.38 percentage 
points – so a 3% point reallocation would raise growth by 
1.1 percentage points. This evidence would appear to 
underline the significance of the debate about the nature, 
scale and funding of public investment in Scotland. 
 
In summary, what can be said is that there is little or no 
theoretical or evidential support for increasing the size of the 
public sector and spending in Scotland. But there may be a 
case for cutting it, on efficiency grounds at least, and for 
considering some rebalancing in favour of investment to 
encourage a more favourable outcome for economic growth.  
 
We should end this section on public spending by stressing 
two caveats. First, this whole area is subject to 
measurement issues and the tendency to fail to compare 
like with like. Secondly, most of the academic evidence on 
the relation between the public sector and economic growth 
is for sovereign states and not for region or sub-state 
entities. Since regions are more open, supply can adjust 
much easier through the in and out-migration of resources 
making crowding out effects due to resource constraints 
less likely. 
 
 
Scottish government’s economic strategy 
 
In November 2007 the Scottish government launched its 
economic strategy.  
 
Before devolution in 1999, Scotland benefited from UK 
economic policy initiatives and regional policy in particular – 
the massive inflow of inward investment in the electronics 
industries in the 1980s and 1990s being an example. And 
Scotland also profited from the activities of the enterprise 
agencies, with many of their policies regarded as state of 
the art far beyond our shores. But there was a lack of 
strategic thinking about the Scottish economy. 
 
The publication by the first Scottish Executive coalition of a 
Framework for Economic Development in Scotland (FEDS) 
in June 2000 changed all that. 
 
FEDS specified the vision underpinning the Executive’s 
desire to stimulate economic development, the perceived 
drivers of growth, specific outcome and enabling objectives, 
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the role of economic development policy and the 
interrelationship with other policies.  
 
In February 2001, further flesh was put on the bones of 
FEDS with the launch of Smart Successful Scotland which 
sought to focus the enterprise networks on the challenges 
confronting the Scottish economy: productivity, 
entrepreneurship, skills and digital connections. To aid 
monitoring, performance indicators formed the basis of an 
annual exercise, outsourced to external consultants, and 
published as Measuring Scotland’s Progress towards a 
Smart Successful Scotland. 
 
This exercise, on balance, identified clear progress in 
entrepreneurship, spending on R&D, skills and learning 
enhancement, and in developing global connections. But 
there was no clear improvement in Scotland’s long-term rate 
of growth, which stands at 1.9% per annum for the period 
1976 to 2006 compared to 2.3% in the UK. 
 
Development policies do take a long while to work and so 
the jury must remain out on the previous Executive’s 
approach to Scotland’s economic development. 
Nevertheless, against this background the new economic 
strategy should be both welcomed and assessed. 
 
Interestingly, a close reading of the new strategy suggests 
that it has more similarities than differences with its 
predecessor. There is some shuffling of the conceptual and 
linguistic pack but both approaches seek to raise Scotland’s 
growth rate and seek to do so by encouraging faster 
productivity growth. The perceived drivers of productivity are 
almost identical: investment, skills, R&D/innovation and 
enterprise. Little if anything is new here.  
 
It might be argued that the adoption of specific targets for 
growth is an improvement on FEDS, which eschewed 
targets because of the undoubted difficulty of precisely 
linking policy inputs to the growth of a complex national 
economy. A task that is much more difficult than that facing 
a company seeking to target faster growth; and we know 
how difficult that in itself can be!  
 
The Scottish government’s primary aim is to raise 
Scotland’s GDP growth rate to the UK level by 2011 and to 
match the growth of the small independent EU countries by 
2017. This might appear to provide a clear means of judging 
the success of the strategy. But on what basis is Scotland to 
match such growth? Is the target to shift Scotland’s long-
term annual trend rate of growth to match the UK trend by 
2011, or will one or two quarters of comparable growth 
around 2011 do? The latter is a much less stringent 
requirement than the former as the recent matching of 
Scottish and UK quarterly growth rates indicates. 
 
Where the strategy clearly has made progress is in the 
adoption of some of the research findings and evidence that 
post-date the FEDS and SSS documents. So, a greater 
emphasis is placed on providing greater support for pre-
school and early learning. There is more recognition of the 
importance of tapping into international knowledge flows 
and technology transfers. And there is a proper appreciation 
of the role of cities in economic development. All of this is to 
be applauded. 
 
Unfortunately, we are not offered much in the way of new 
policy initiatives to stimulate the drivers of productivity and 
growth. It is clear that the government believes in the power 
of competitive taxation to promote economic development 
but offers no radical proposal to significantly cut non-
domestic rates. The strategy does argue for a lower rate of 
corporation tax in Scotland compared to the UK but 
bemoans the absence of full tax raising and spending 
powers in Scotland. However, the creation of a Council of 
Economic Advisers should also be viewed as a key strand in 
the new strategy. Staffed by an array of distinguished 
economic and business talent, many from outside Scotland, 
the Council can be viewed as an important innovation from 
the Government. It offers the prospect of interesting new 
policies being developed to raise Scotland’s trend rate of 
growth. One problem though is that the policy benefits from 
the creation of such a body are likely to take some time to 
come to fruition. 
 
 
GDP and Output 
 
Trends since 1998 and 2005 
 
The Scottish economy, in terms of gross value added 
(GVA), or GDP at basic prices, performed strongly during 
2007, with growth above trend in the final three quarters and 
above UK growth in the second half of the year – see Figure 
1.  The growth of UK GDP weakened in the second half of 
2007 to 0.63% per quarter, which is below its quarterly 
growth trend of 0.68% since the first quarter of 1998 – see 
Table 1. The Scottish economy does tend to perform better 
relative to the UK when the UK economy is slowing and last 
year proved to be no exception. 
 
Nevertheless, Scottish growth did strengthen last year both 
absolutely as well as relatively. During the last three 
quarters of 2007, quarterly GVA growth averaged 0.78%, 
compared to the trend quarterly average from the first 
quarter of 1998 of 0.51%. Indeed, the data show that 
Scottish growth has been on an upward trend since the first 
quarter of 2005, with quarterly growth averaging 0.61% 
compared to an average of 0.47% between 1998Q1 and 
2005Q1. This trend improvement did not occur at the UK 
level, where quarterly growth averaged 0.68% between 
1998Q1 and 2005Q1 and 0.69% since 2005Q1. 
 
The improvement in Scotland’s growth performance since 
the beginning of 2005 is evident in both services and 
manufacturing – see Figures 2 and 3 and Table 1. 
 
From 2005, manufacturing began to shake-off the some of 
the problems posed by the recession in electronics in the 
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early years of the decade. Quarterly growth in 
manufacturing averaged 0.18% from the first quarter of 
2005, compared to an average quarterly contraction of -
0.41% between 1998Q1 and 2005Q1. This marked 
improvement in the performance of manufacturing accounts 
for about half of the improvement in overall Scottish GVA 
between the two periods.  
 
The improved performance of the much bigger service 
sector, where growth averaged 0.70% to 2005Q1 rising to 
0.81% thereafter, accounts for the other half of the 
improvement in overall Scottish GVA between the two 
periods. It should be noted that the other principal sectors, 
construction, electricity, gas & water, mining & quarrying 
and agriculture – accounting together for around 12% of 
overall Scottish GVA – experienced deterioration in their 
trend performance between the two periods. 
 
Within services the main sub-sectors that contributed to the 
improved performance of the Scottish economy post 2005 
were real estate & business services (19% of economy 
GVA) where quarterly growth improved to 1.3% from 0.94%, 
retail & wholesale (11% of economy GVA) with improved 
quarterly growth from 0.4% to 0.85%, transport & 
communication (7% of economy GVA) from 1.06% to 
1.89%, and other services (6% of economy GVA). Figure 5 
shows that it is transport & communication and real estate & 
business services, followed by financial services, which 
have displayed the strongest growth since 2004. 
 
However, financial services (8% of economy GVA), for a 
long time a key driver of the Scottish economy, began to 
stutter in the post 2005Q1 period with quarterly growth 
averaging 0.98% compared to 2.03% in the earlier period. 
The weakening performance of financial services was much 
influenced by the downturn in the second and third quarters 
of last year with GVA falling by 3% and 2% respectively. 
What remains unclear is how much this weaker 
performance was related to the “credit crunch” and/or 
whether other factors contributed. Growth in the public 
sector also slowed in the post 2005Q1 period with quarterly 
growth averaging 0.3% compared to 0.47% earlier.  
 
Finally, the performance of hotels & catering suffered 
something of a collapse between the two periods, with GVA 
contracting by 0.38% per quarter post 2005Q1 compared to 
positive growth of 0.12% per quarter between 1998 and 
2005.  
 
 
Performance in fourth quarter 2007 
 
The latest
ii
 official outturn data for the Scottish economy 
refer to the fourth quarter 2007. Total Scottish GVA rose by 
0.9% in the quarter and by 2.2% over the year. The 
comparable UK figures were 0.6% and 2.9%. So, despite 
Scotland’s strong growth performance in the quarter both 
absolutely and relative to the UK, growth over the year, 
while above trend, remained below the UK.  
Both the service sector and manufacturing, with growth of 
1.3% and 1.5% respectively, outperformed their UK 
counterparts where growth was 0.7% and no change. 
Construction performed comparably during the quarter, with 
growth of 1% in Scotland and growth of 1.1% in the UK. In 
contrast, the other principal sectors were all weaker in 
Scotland. Electricity, gas & water contracted by 7.8% 
compared to an increase of 2.8% in the industry in the UK. 
Mining & quarrying experienced a 4.3% contraction in 
comparison to a small fall of 0.1% in the UK. Finally, 
agriculture, forestry & fishing grew by 0.6% in Scotland 
compared to 2.1% in the UK. 
 
Within Scottish services all principal sub-sectors exhibited 
positive growth in the fourth quarter with the strongest 
performing sectors financial services (4.6% growth) and 
other services (5.5%). The public sector exhibited the 
weakest growth, a not insignificant 0.5%, above its trend 
rate since1998. 
 
Within manufacturing, of the key sectors electrical & 
instrument engineering (electronics) exhibited the fastest 
growth, growing by 6% during the quarter but contracting by 
2.9% over the year. This was followed by mechanical 
engineering with 4.6% growth during the quarter and 9.3% 
over the year, drink, 2.3% in the quarter and 5.3% over the 
year, and chemicals, 1.3% in the quarter and 5% over the 
year. At the other extreme the weakest manufacturing 
sectors in Scotland were, transport equipment, which 
contracted by 5.4% during the quarter and by 2.9% over the 
year, textiles, footwear, leather & clothing, with a fall of 1.5% 
in the quarter and by 7.3% over the year, and paper, printing 
& publishing, where GVA fell by 1.2% in the quarter and by 
4.6% over the year.  
 
 
 
Outlook 
 
The outlook for the Scottish economy appeared fairly certain 
when we last reported in July 2007. Growth was expected to 
remain above trend in 2007 and 2008 at 2.5% and 2.3% 
respectively. Prospects for the economy in the medium-term 
were considered to be good. Almost one year later, the 
comparative certainty of last July has evaporated. 
 
The July 2007 Commentary cautioned that surging oil prices 
were adding to inflationary pressures, with the direct 
consequences augmented by the possibility of knock-on 
effects on earnings and wage settlements. It also 
recognised that the slowdown in the US housing market was 
putting US, and implicitly world, growth at risk.  
 
What we didn’t appreciate was that the oil price would 
continue its surge to $139 to date and as discussed above 
with every prospect that it will go quite a bit higher before 
subsiding. Nor did we understand the magnitude of forces 
that would be unleashed following the downturn in the 
housing market: house price falls and higher interest rates; 
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massive foreclosures in the sub-prime mortgage market; 
significant bank and hedge fund losses as the value of 
innovative investments based on sub-prime mortgages 
collapsed; and the subsequent drying up of liquidity in 
financial markets, or what we now know as the ‘credit 
crunch’. 
 
The world economy has been caught in a tightening vice of 
financial restriction, financial insolvency and illiquidity on the 
one hand, and depressed real incomes with rising 
inflationary expectations on the other, due to the significant 
oil and commodity price rises. The twin crises have 
effectively blown away the settled expectations of the last 15 
years, in the major OECD economies at least, of steady 
growth with low or no inflation. (See the detailed discussion 
of recent developments in the world economy later in this 
Commentary.) 
 
The spectre of stagflation now stalks the major economies. 
The risk of accelerating inflation combined with low, zero or 
even negative growth has risen considerably. A return to the 
instability of the 1970s and early 1980s now has a much 
higher probability. 
 
Yet, it is not all ‘doom and gloom’. There is still hope that the 
crises can be negotiated without economic catastrophe. 
World trade continues to be strong with growth of 6.6% 
forecast in 2008 and 6.7% in 2009. Growth of GDP 
continues strongly in China, and other parts of Asia, while 
growth in the Euro area, Japan and even the US is forecast 
to slow in 2008 and 2009, the expected slowdown is not 
dramatic (See Table 1 of World Economy section.)  Overall, 
growth of real GDP in the OECD is projected to slacken but 
not dramatically, from 3.1% and 2.7% in 2006 and 2007 to 
2% and 2.1% in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Conversely, 
the overall OECD inflation rate is forecast to rise from 2% in 
2007 to 3.1% in 2008 and 2.7% in 2009. But, given the 
heightened levels of uncertainty all forecasts must be 
treated with even more caution than would be the case at 
other times. 
 
The UK and Scottish economies cannot be immune from the 
greater prospect in the world economy of sustained higher 
inflation, slower growth, and an eventual weakening of the 
labour market with declining job creation and rising 
unemployment. Yet the flexibility, especially in the labour 
market, and resilience displayed by the UK economy over 
the past ten to fifteen years may help in negotiating the 
current crisis (See the article by Gurney, 2008, cited in the 
UK Economy section below).  UK growth has in recent years 
been strong by international standards while inflation has 
remained comparatively low. Much credit for this can be 
taken by the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of 
England in providing a stable monetary framework through 
judicious interest rate setting. Gurney, also cites the policy 
of less stringent product and labour market regulation as 
further contributors to the flexibility and resilience of the UK 
economy. 
That said, the rapid weakening of the housing market, the 
tightening of credit in both housing and in other markets, the 
significant hike in oil prices, rising commodity and food 
prices, weakness in key export markets, will together serve 
to slow consumption, investment and export demand to the 
detriment of UK growth. The $64k question is to predict the 
extent of these wider shocks on the demand for UK and 
Scottish produced products and hence predict the impact on 
UK and Scottish economic growth. Moreover, the 
inflationary consequences, in the light also of the recent 
decline in the exchange value of sterling with the effective 
rate falling by around 12% since July 2007, remain difficult 
to predict. 
 
Against this background, we take the view that UK growth 
will slow this year and next, from 3% in 2007 to 1.8% this 
year and then 1.6% in 2009. But growth should pick up 
thereafter. The consensus on inflation is for CPI to rise by 
2.8% in 2008 and by 2.1%, rising slightly to 2.2% in the two 
years after that, still above the 2% target. 
 
What, then, is the outlook for Scottish GDP growth? 
 
At the turn of the year, the Scottish economy was clearly 
outperforming the UK in terms of GDP growth with, as noted 
above and in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section 
below, manufacturing exhibiting positive growth and both 
manufacturing and services doing better in Scotland than in 
the UK. The data for GDP growth in 2008Q1 are not 
published until 23rd July, so we must rely on survey data to 
monitor the performance of the Scottish economy in 2008 
and to assist in the preparation of our forecasts for the 
medium term. 
 
Our Review of Scottish Business Surveys presented below 
reveals, as might be expected, an overall slow down in 
orders and activity but with export trends remaining positive. 
The demand for labour is also found to be easing and there 
is clear evidence of increasing cost pressures and 
accelerating prices. For those surveys that take a forward 
look the expectation is for a further weakening of demand, 
further increases in cost pressures and an overall slow 
down in the economy. The Bank of Scotland’s Index of 
Leading Economic Indicators latest report (June 2008) 
suggested that Scottish economic growth is set to continue 
expanding over the coming quarters but with growth easing 
in 2008 reflecting the global economic trends. Conditions in 
the labour market continued to be fairly firm and this would 
help bolster domestic consumer spending. 
 
In the light of the GDP outturn data and the evidence from 
the latest survey data, we expect the growth of demand to 
moderate in the Scottish economy in 2008 and 2009. The 
growth of consumer spending moderates but does not slow 
as much as in the UK. This reflects the relative strength of 
both the housing and labour markets in Scotland. The 
growth of private sector investment demand also slows. The 
slowdown in the growth of domestic Scottish demand is in 
addition affected by the planned slowing in the growth of 
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Key Forecasts of the Scottish Economy 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
GVA % 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
    
Overall 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.8 
 Manufacturing 0.7 1.4 1.8 0.8 
 Construction -1.5 -2.1 1.4 1.6 
 Services 3.4 2.5 1.8 2.2 
     
Jobs change – nos 8,500 8,800 9,900 17,900 
     
Unemployment %     
ILO 
Claimant count 
4.8 
2.8 
4.6 
2.3 
4.4 
2.2 
4.2 
2.0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
public spending. To be set against this is a strengthening of 
export demand from outside the UK, which reflects the 
benefits of the decline in the exchange value of sterling and 
continued growth in Scotland’s principal export markets.  
 
When fed into our Medium Term Model these demand 
projections generate a forecast for GVA/GDP in the 
aggregate for the Scottish economy and by sector. Table 2 
in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section below 
provides a summary of the main forecasts. A truncated 
version is presented here. 
 
Growth in Scotland falls to trend this year and then slips 
below trend in 2009 picking up slightly but remaining below 
trend in 2010 and returning to the 1.9% trend in 2011. 
Throughout this period net jobs continue to be created in 
the Scottish economy, although at fairly low rates, largely 
driven by the service sector. This helps maintain 
unemployment at and below present levels.  
 
Scottish growth outperforms expected UK growth of 1.8% 
this year and stays just above UK growth in 2009. But in 
2010 Scottish growth slips behind the UK growth as the UK 
rate rises towards its trend at 2.5%. With UK growth now 
predicted to be around 2.6% in 2011, we think it unlikely on 
present information that the Scottish government’s target of 
parity with UK growth by 2011 will be met.  
 
However, these forecasts come with a significant health 
warning. The levels of uncertainty as to future outcomes 
are very high indeed given present conditions in the world 
economy. There is a considerable downside risk that 
growth and inflation in both Scotland and the UK will be 
worse than forecast here. This will especially be the case if 
the price of oil fails to stabilise and subside and the 
deterioration in the housing market and the problems 
confronting the financial markets are worse than 
anticipated. 
 
__________________ 
 
Endnotes: 
i
Conducted across 60 countries for the period 1970 to 1985. 
 
ii
Published on the 23
rd
 April. First quarter 2008 data are expected 
on 23
rd
 July. 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
13 June 2008
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Pages 4-16 
Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2007q4 
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Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2007q4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 3: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2007q4 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK Electronics GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2007q4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
19
98
 q
2
19
98
 q
3
19
98
q4
19
99
q1
19
99
q2
19
99
q3
19
99
q4
20
00
q1
20
00
q2
20
00
q3
20
00
q4
20
01
q1
20
01
q2
20
01
q3
20
01
q4
20
02
q1
20
02
q2
20
02
q3
20
02
q4
20
03
q1
20
03
q2
20
03
q3
20
03
q4
20
04
q1
20
04
q2
20
04
q3
20
04
q4
20
05
q1
20
05
q2
20
05
q3
20
05
q4
20
06
q1
20
06
q2
20
06
q3
20
06
q4
20
07
q1
20
07
q2
20
07
q3
20
07
q4
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Scotland
UK
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
19
98
 q
2
19
98
 q
3
19
98
q4
19
99
q1
19
99
q2
19
99
q3
19
99
q4
20
00
q1
20
00
q2
20
00
q3
20
00
q4
20
01
q1
20
01
q2
20
01
q3
20
01
q4
20
02
q1
20
02
q2
20
02
q3
20
02
q4
20
03
q1
20
03
q2
20
03
q3
20
03
q4
20
04
q1
20
04
q2
20
04
q3
20
04
q4
20
05
q1
20
05
q2
20
05
q3
20
05
q4
20
06
q1
20
06
q2
20
06
q3
20
06
q4
20
07
q1
20
07
q2
20
07
q3
20
07
q4
%
Scotland
UK
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Pages 4-16 
Figure 5: Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2007q4 
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Table 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GVA Percentage Growth from 1998Q1 to 2007Q4 and by Sub-Periods 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SCOTLAND           
Weights 1000 992 16 11 27 139 68 738 112 
  All All Agriculture Mining & Electricity Gas &  Manufacturing Constn Services Retail  & 
   less oil & Gas forestry & fish Quarrying Water       Wholesale 
Whole period growth  0.51 0.53 0.04 -0.89 -0.38 -0.24 0.61 0.73 0.53 
Growth to 2005q1 0.47 0.48 0.15 -0.41 -0.19 -0.41 0.71 0.70 0.40 
Growth from 2005q1 0.61 0.64 -0.26 -2.11 -0.85 0.18 0.37 0.81 0.85 
            
UK           
Weights 1000 980 10 22 17 147 61 744 122 
  All All Agriculture Mining & Electricity Gas &  Manufacturing Constn Services Retail  & 
   less oil & Gas forestry & fish Quarrying Water       Wholesale 
Whole period growth  0.68 0.71 0.26 -0.94 0.39 0.06 0.46 0.89 0.86 
Growth to 2005q1 0.68 0.71 0.11 -0.81 0.50 0.02 0.48 0.90 0.91 
Growth from 2005q1 0.69 0.73 0.64 -1.27 0.11 0.14 0.39 0.88 0.74 
            
SCOTLAND           
Weights  35 74 83 193 230 58 -47   
   Hotels Transport  Financial  Real estate &  Public admin,  Other  FSA   
   & catering & Comm Services Business Serv Educn & health Services    
Whole period growth   -0.02 1.30 1.74 1.04 0.42 0.61 1.76   
Growth to 2005q1  0.12 1.06 2.03 0.94 0.47 0.64 1.90   
Growth from 2005q1  -0.38 1.89 0.98 1.30 0.30 0.52 1.42   
            
UK           
Weights  31 78 79 244 183 53 -46   
   Hotels Transport  Financial  Real estate &  Public admin,  Other  FSA   
   & catering & Comm Services Business Serv Educn & health Services    
Whole period growth   0.83 1.21 1.57 1.25 0.49 0.50 2.33   
Growth to 2005q1  0.77 1.32 1.29 1.24 0.52 0.37 2.00   
Growth from 2005q1   0.99 0.95 2.29 1.29 0.39 0.85 3.18   
          
 
Note:       FSA is Financial Services Adjustment        
Source:  Scottish Government GVA statistics and FAI calculations       
 
